State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from April 12, 2013 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
4-12-2013 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from April 12, 2013 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from April 12, 
2013 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/655 
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK CASE NO. S-0006
for a determination pursuant to CSL §212.
, BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
On November 20, 2012, the Suffolk County Board of Legislators adopted 
Resolution No. 961-2012 authorizing the termination of the Suffolk County Public 
Employment Relations Board as established by Suffolk County Local Law No. 4-1978,1 
as last amended by Suffolk County Local Law No. 4-19991 2 and currently codified, as 
Section 68-6 of the Suffolk County Administrative Code. Pursuant to the most recent 
resolution, all local provisions and procedures relating to the Suffolk County Public 
Employment Relations Board were abolished. The County has published a notice of 
termination in the County office buildings and in a newspaper of general circulation.
We find that the County of Suffolk has fully complied with §203.6 of our Rules of 
Procedure to terminate a local public employment relations board and, therefore we
1 Local Law No. 4-1978 amended Local Law No. 5-1968, which first established the 
Suffolk County Public Employment Relations Board as approved by this Board. See, 
County of Suffolk, 1 PERB fl376 (1968).
2 The last amendment cited to in the Resolution adopted by Suffolk County Board of 
Legislators was dated 1999. However, the' last amendment approved by this Board was 
dated 1990. See County of Suffolk, 23 PERB 1J3041 (1990).
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determine that our March 27, 1968 Order3 and all subsequent Orders4 approving the 
establishment of the local public employment relations board should be rescinded.
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the order of this Board, dated March 27, 
1968, and all subsequent Board Orders previously referenced, approving the resolution 
establishing the Suffolk County Public Employment Relations Board be, and the same 
hereby are, rescinded, effective April 12, 2013.
WE FURTHER ORDER that all matters pending before the Suffolk County Public 
Employment Relations Board as of April 12, 2013, be forwarded to PERB for further 
processing.
DATED: April 12, 2013
Albany, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
3 County of Suffolk, 1 PERB |f376 (1968).
4 There have been over a dozen Board determinations concerning the establishment of 
the Suffolk County Public Employment Relations Board. See County of Suffolk, 1 
PERB |f376 (1968); 3 PERB |f3075 (1970); 4 PERB |f3054 (1971); 5 PERB P016 
(1972); 7 PERB |f3033 (1974); 8 PERB ||3001 (1975); 11 PERB 1f3041 (1978); 13 
PERB |f3018 (1980); 15 PERB |f3026 (1982); 17 PERB ||3053 (1984); 19 PERB ||3007 
(1986); 21 PERB ||3013 (1988); 23 PERB |f3041 (1990).
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
DUTCHESS UNITED EDUCATORS,
- and -
Charging Party,
DUTCHESS COMMUNITY COLLEGE and 
COUNTY OF DUTCHESS,
CASE NO. U-29746
Respondent.
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O’SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of counsel), 
for Charging Party
ROEMER WALLENS GOLD & MINEAUX LLP (EARL T. REDDING of 
counsel), for Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Dutchess United 
Educators (DUE) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an 
improper practice charge alleging that the Dutchess Community College and County of 
Dutchess (College) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it unilaterally changed procedures governing promotions and tenure by 
making deletions to the Professional Staff Handbook, and thereafter failed to negotiate 
with DUE concerning the deletions.
The ALJ concluded that although the subject of the charge is a'mandatory 
subject, the College satisfied its duty to negotiate that subject under the Act based upon
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§7.2 of the parties’ collectively negotiated agreement (agreement).1
In its exceptions, DUE asserts, inter alia, that the ALJ erred, in determining that 
the College satisfied its duty to negotiate because the defense was not pleaded in the 
answer, the defense was not litigated by the parties, and the record does not support 
such a defense.
Following our review of the DUE’S exceptions and the College’s response, we 
reverse the ALJ’s decision finding that the College satisfied its duty to negotiate and 
conclude that the College violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it unilaterally changed 
the promotion and tenure procedures and thereafter did not negotiate in good faith with 
DUE concerning the changes.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After DUE filed its charge, the College filed an answer, which pleaded the
following first affirmative defense:
13. DUE has waived its right to negotiate with respect to the 
subject matter herein in that the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement at Article 7.2 provides for the establishment of a 
Committee on Promotion and Tenure which has the 
exclusive responsibility to “advjse the President and Board 
of Trustees on all matters having to do with promotion of 
teacher educators...”
The College’s answer does not include a separate duty satisfaction defense. 
During the College’s opening statement, it twice stated it intended to prove “waiver by
r-
the union.”1 2 Toward the end of the hearing, the College again referenced its
1 45 PERBU4605 (2012).
2 Transcript, pp. 14,16.
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affirmative defense of waiver.3 Prior to issuance of the ALJ’s decision, the College did 
not seek leave to amend its answer, pursuant to §204.3 of the Rules of Procedure 
(Rules), to add a duty satisfaction defense premised upon the terms of the parties’ 
agreement.
FACTS
Article 7.2 of the parties expired agreement is entitled “Promotion of Teaching 
Educators.” Article 7.2(b) and (c) state:
(b) A Committee on Promotion and Tenure shall be 
established to advise the President and Board of 
Trustees on all matters having to do with promotion of 
teaching educators, granting of continuing 
appointments and non-reappointment of continuing 
appointments. The Committee shall consist of 10 
tenured faculty members—one from each 
department—with one-half elected annually by the 
teaching educators. Each department will elect its 
representative through a process conducted by the 
office of the Dean of Academic Affairs. Department 
heads will be ineligible to serve if they have 
candidates, for promotion or tenure from their 
department. No faculty member will be allowed to 
serve more than two successive two-year terms. No . 
candidate for promotion shall serve on the committee 
during the period of his/her candidacy for promotion.
(c) Within each department of the College, all teaching 
educators meeting minimum requirements for 
promotion and/or tenure shall be considered by a 
committee composed of the department head and all 
tenured teaching educators of that department.
Formal procedures for departmental 
recommendations on promotions and continuing 
appointments shall be made in accordance with 
procedures promulgated by the Board of Trustees.4
3 Transcript, p. 91.
4Joint Exhibit 1.
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Since at least 2000, §8.2.3 of the College’s Professional Staff Handbook 
(Handbook) has delineated a detailed procedure for promotion and tenure of DUE unit 
members. On September 16, 2009, the College president sent an e-mail announcing 
unilateral editorial and procedural changes to §8.2 of the Handbook that he had 
approved after receiving recommendations from the Committee on Promotion and 
Tenure: The Committee on Promotion and Tenure is composed often DUE members 
representing each academic department. The changes to the Handbook unilaterally 
imposed by the College president included the deletion of procedural rights for 
candidates seeking promotion and tenure under §§8.2.3(B) and (C) of the Handbook.
Section 8.2.3(B) was changed to eliminate the right of.a candidate to submit
materials to supplement her or his application form for promotion or tenure:
The department head will send 12 copies of the signed 
application form to the Office of the Dean of Academic 
Affairs by 5:00 p.m. of the first day of classes of the spring 
. semester. An additional copy should be placed in the open 
personnel file. The form should be submitted without 
attachment unless additional space is needed to furnish a 
complete explanation on a point. A-eandidate may create a 
packet of materials to be held by the Promotion and Tenure 
Committee chairperson, if desired.
The change to §8.2.3(C) of the Handbook eliminated a candidate’s right to
request a review or an explanation of the recommendations made by the Committee on
Promotion and Tenure concerning her or his application:
The Committee on Promotion and Tenure shall forward in 
writing its recommendations to the Dean of Academic 
Affairs. The Dean of Academic Affairs shall carefully 
consider the recommendations of the Committee and shall 
thereafter forward his/her recommendations, together with 
the Committee’s recommendations, to the President. The 
President shall carefully consider the recommendations of
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the Committee and shall thereafter forward his/her 
recommendations, together with the Committee’s 
recommendations, to the Board of Trustees. Notice of 
promotion and tenure shall be publicly announced within a 
reasonable time after the individuals concerned are notified.
Any candidate may request a review or ex-planation-ef 
Committee reeemmendations from either -t-he-Bean-o-f 
Academic A-ffai-r-s-er-the President, or bofe
Thereafter, the Committee on Promotion and Tenure rescinded its 
recommendations concerning the two changes to the Handbook. The College, however 
has not restored the unilaterally deleted sentences to the Handbook, leading to the 
filing of the present charge.
DISCUSSION
There is a fundamental distinction between a waiver defense and a duty 
satisfaction defense under the Act. While earlier precedent had confused those 
distinctions, our decision over a decade ago in County of Nassau (Police Department)5 
succinctly clarified the essential differences: -
We take the opportunity at the outset of our decision to 
clarify the nature of a defense grounded upon a claim that 
the subject(s) sought to be bargained pursuant to a charging 
party's demand have already been negotiated to completion.
This Board's decisions have sometimes characterized this 
defense as duty satisfaction, sometimes waiver by 
agreement, and sometimes simultaneously both duty 
satisfaction and waiver. Although the second and third 
characterizations cannot be considered wholly inaccurate, 
we believe that the first most accurately describes the true 
nature of this particular defense.
Waiver concepts suggest that a charging party has 
surrendered something. Although waiver may accurately 
- describe a loss of right, such as one relinquished by silence,
31 PERB 1J3064 (1998).5
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inaction, or certain other types of conduct, the defense as 
described is not one under which a respondent is claiming 
that the charging party has suffered or should be made to 
suffer a loss of right. Under this particular defense, a 
respondent is claiming affirmatively that it and the charging 
party have already negotiated the subject(s) at issue and 
have reached an agreement as to how the subject(s) is to be 
treated, at least for the duration of the parties' agreement.
By expressing this particular defense as duty satisfaction, 
we give a better recognition to the factual circumstances 
actually giving rise to it and expect to avoid the confusion 
and imprecision in analysis which have sometimes been 
caused by the other noted characterizations of this defense.6 
(Footnote omitted)
Pursuant to §204.3(c)(2) of our Rules, an answer shall “include a specific, 
detailed statement of any affirmative defense,” containing “a clear and concise 
statement of the facts supporting any affirmative defense....” The Rule’s specificity 
requirement ensures that a charging party is not taken by surprise by an issue not 
appearing on the face of the responsive pleading.7
In order for an affirmative defense of waiver to be sustained, a respondent must 
have pleaded the defense,8 and proved that a negotiated agreement contains a clear, 
intentional and unmistakable relinquishment of the right to negotiate the particular
6 Supra, note 5, 31 PERB 1J3Q64 at 3142. See also, County of Columbia, 41 PERB 
113023 (2008); Village of Pelham Manor, 44 PERB 1J4595 (2011)(referencing the 
distinctions between the two defenses.)
7 New York City Transit Auth, 20 PERB 1J3037 (1987).
8 See, New York City Transit Auth, supra, note 7; Clarkstown Cent Sch Dist, 24 PERB 
1J3047 (1991.)(“Waiver is an affirmative defense which must be raised in the answer if 
the defense is to be properly considered.”)
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subject under the Act.9 Neither Article 7.2(b) nor (c) satisfies the applicable standard 
for waiver.
With respect to the distinct affirmative defense of duty satisfaction, the burden 
rests with the respondent to plead and prove through negotiated terms that are 
reasonably clear that it satisfied its duty to negotiate a particular subject.10
In the present case, the College did not plead duty satisfaction as an affirmative 
defense or allege in its answer that Article 7.2(c) of the parties’ agreement constitutes a 
reasonably clear provision that satisfied its duty to negotiate procedures concerning 
promotion and tenure. The answer included only a waiver defense, which the College 
premised upon language from Article 7.2(b) of the agreement concerning the creation 
of the Committee on Promotion and Tenure to “advise the President and Board of 
Trustees on all matters having to do with promotion of teacher educators...” 
Furthermore, the record reveals that the duty satisfaction defense was not litigated or , 
even mentioned during the hearing and the College stated on the record that its 
contractual defense was premised upon waiver.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the ALJ erred in sustaining the duty
9 CSEA v Newman, 88 AD2d 685, 15 PERB 1(7011 (3d Dept 1982) app dismissed 57 
NY2d 775, 15 PERB 1(7020 (1982), affd 61 NY2d 1001, 17 PERB K7007 
(1984)(subsequent history omitted.) See also, County of Columbia, supra, note 6;
New York State Canal Corp, 30 PERB 1(3070.(1997).
10 Shelter Island Union Free Sch Dist, 45 PERB K3032 (2012); Niagara Frontier Transit 
Metro System, Inc., 42 PERB 1(3023 (2009); County of Greene and Sheriff of Greene 
County, 42 PERB 1(3031 (2009); NYCTA, 41 PERB K3014 (2008).
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satisfaction defense because the College did not plead it as an affirmative defense.11 
Therefore, we reverse the A.LJ’s decision dismissing the charge and conclude that the 
College violated. §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act when it unilaterally changed a mandatory 
subject of negotiations, the promotion and tenure procedures in the Handbook, and did 
not negotiate the changes in good faith with DUE.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Dutchess Community College and 
the County of Dutchess:
1. Reinstate the procedural rights for candidates seeking, promotion 
and tenure that were deleted from §§8.2.3(B) and (C) of the 
Professional Staff Handbook on September 16, 2009;
)
2. Cease and desist from failing to negotiate with Dutchess United 
Educators concerning the deletions to §§8.2.3(B) and (C) of the 
Professional Staff Handbook;
3. Conduct a de novo review, of all applications for promotions and 
tenure by Dutchess United Educators unit employees that were 
denied since September 16, 2009, without regard to the deletions 
made to the procedural rights in §§8.2.3(B) and (C) of the 
Professional Staff Handbook; if such de novo reviews result in 
determinations to promote or grant tenure, the affected Dutchess 
United Educators unit employees shall be made whole for any 
loss of pay, benefits or positions with interest at the maximum 
legal rate; and 1
11 We might have reached a different conclusion had the College’s answer been filed 
prior to our clarification in County of Nassau (Police Department), supra, note 5 
regarding the distinctions between the two defenses. See, State of New York (Racing 
and Wagering), 45 PERB 1J3041 (2012) confirmed sub nom, Kent v. Lefkowitz, 46 
PERB ||7006 (Sup Ct Albany County 2013).
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4. Sign, post and distribute the attached notice in all locations 
normally used to communicate both in writing and electronically 
with unit employees.
Dated: April 12, 2013
Albany, New York
if  _________
/ ! Jerome Lefkoyltz, Chairperson
X' Sheila S. Cole, Member
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
we hereby notify all employees of the Dutchess Community College and the County of Dutchess 
(College), in the unit represented by the Dutchess United Educators, that the College will:
1. Reinstate the procedural rights for candidates seeking promotion and 
tenure that were deleted from §§8.2.3(B) and (C) of the Professional 
Staff Handbook on September 16, 2009;
2. , Negotiate with Dutchess United Educators concerning the deletions to
§§8.2.3(B) and (C) of the Professional Staff Handbook;
3. Conduct a c/e novo review of all applications for promotions and tenure 
by Dutchess United Educators unit employees that were denied since 
September 16, 2009, without regard to the deletions that had been 
made to the procedural rights in §§8.2.3(B) and (C) of the Professional 
Staff Handbook; if such cfe novo reviews result in determinations to 
promote or grant tenure, the affected Dutchess United Educators unit 
employees shall be made whole for any loss of pay, benefits or 
positions with interest at the maximum legal rate.
Dated ...................  B y .....................................................
On behalf of Dutchess Community 
College and County of Dutchess
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must 
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
ASSOCIATED MUSICIANS OF GREATER NEW 
YORK, LOCAL 802, AFM,
Charging Party,
- and -
NESHOMA ORCHESTRAS,
CASE NO. UP-32452
Respondent.
HARVEY MARS, ESQ., for Charging Party
RAAB, STURM & GANCHROW, LLP (IRA A. STURM of counsellor
Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to the Board on a pre-hearing motion dated February 11,2013, 
by Neshoma Orchestras (Neshoma), pursuant to 12 NYCRR §253.6, concerning an 
unfair labor practice complaint on a charge filed by the Associated Musicians of Greater 
New York, Local 802, AFM (AFM) alleging that Neshoma engaged in an unfair labor 
practice in violation of §§704.6 and 10 of the New York State Employment Relations 
Act (SERA). In its motion, Neshoma requests the Board to file a petition with the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for an advisory opinion, pursuant to 29 CFR 
§102.98, concerning whether the NLRB would decline to assert jurisdiction over the 
parties.
On January 28, 2013, the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) issued a complaint, and the case has been assigned to an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ issued a notice on February 5, 2013 
scheduling a conference and directing Neshoma to file an answer to the complaint.
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In support of its motion, Neshoma has submitted an affidavit describing its 
business, the location of its offices, and its gross annual revenues in the past three 
calendar years. It contends that the information contained in its affidavit satisfies the 
NLRB’s discretionary jurisdiction criteria for both retail sales and non-retail sales1 and, 
therefore, we lack jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
Our procedures under SERA provide Neshoma with a full and fair opportunity to 
plead in its answer and to present evidentiary proof demonstrating that our jurisdiction 
is preempted because it is an employer under §2 of the NLRA. Indeed, it is possible 
that the question of jurisdiction may be resolved at the scheduled pre-hearing 
conference. It is far more expeditious for the jurisdictional question raised by Neshoma 
to be resolved through the continued processing of the complaint under SERA. If the 
jurisdictional issue remains in dispute following an ALJ decision, the Board retains the 
discretion to petition the NLRB for an advisory opinion, if necessary.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Neshoma’s motion is denied, and that 
the processing of the complaint shall proceed forthwith consistent with our decision. *
DATED: April 12,2013
Albany, New York
(J Jerome Lefkftwitz^hairperson
. . . .
Sheila S. Cole, Member
See, Marty Levitt, 171 NLRB 739 (1968).1
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of •
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AFT, AFL-CIO,
Charging Party,
- and -
SISULU-WALKER CHARTER SCHOOL OF HARLEM,
Respondent.
CASE NO. U-32090
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (JENNIFER A. HOGAN of 
counsel), for Charging Party
DLA PIPER LLP (US) (PHILLIP H. WANG of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Sisulu-Walker Charter 
School of Harlem (Sisulu-Walker) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) on an improper practice charge filed by the 
United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) concluding that Sisulu- 
Walker violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
failed to respond to two requests from the UFT to commence collective negotiations.1
In its exceptions, Sisulu-Walker asserts, inter alia, that the Director erred in 
finding that it violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act and in ordering it to commence 
negotiations with the UFT. It also claims that the Director’s ruling, which granted it 1
1 46 PERB 1|4505 (2013).
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additional time to submit a brief, constitutes a reversible procedural error because the 
extension of time was not sufficient. UFT supports the Director’s decision.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
A. Board Decision, Certification and Order to Negotiate 
In Sisulu-Walker Charter School of Harlem,2 we denied exceptions filed by 
Sisulu-Walker and affirmed a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluding 
that the unit most appropriate at the school for purposes of collective negotiations under 
the Act is one composed of the following positions: Teacher, Co-Teacher, Resident 
Teacher, Guidance Counselor, Teacher Assistant, Social Worker, Title 1 Teacher, ELL 
Intervention Specialist, Special Education Teacher, Chorus Coordinator/Director and 
Recreational Coordinator. In reaching our decision, we rejected Sisulu-Walker’s 
contention that employees who participate in the School Leadership Team (SLT) should 
be excluded from the unit on the grounds that they are managerial and/or confidential 
employees:
While SLT members make suggestions and 
recommendations, they do not have the authority to 
formulate or modify school policies, objectives or curricula. 
Nor do they have the authority to determine the methods, 
means and personnel to effectuate school policies or have a 
primary role in personnel administration including hiring, 
discharge and evaluations. Those responsibilities rest 
squarely, with the Board of Trustees, Victory and the school’s 
administration team.3
2 45 PERBH3019 (2012), petition dismissed Sisulu-Walker Charter School of Harlem v 
New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 45 PERB fl7012 (Sup Ct New York County
2012)(notice of appeal filed).
3 45 PERB H3019, at 3048 (2012).
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We subsequently certified the UFT as the exclusive representative of the at-issue
unit and ordered Sisulu-Walker to negotiate collectively with the UFT.4 In our
certification and order, we stated: -
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession..
B. Article 78 Proceeding Commenced by Sisulu-Walker
On May 12, 2012, Sisulu-Walker commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding 
seeking a judgment reversing our decision to include employees who participate in SLT 
"" in the negotiating unit. It has not sought judicial review of our certification of the UFT 
and our related order mandating it to negotiate with the UFT.
On November 25, 2012, New York State Supreme Court Justice Joan B. Lobis . 
issued a decision, order and judgment dismissing the Article 78 proceeding commenced 
by Sisulu-Walker finding that our denial of its exceptions was not affected by an error of 
law or was arbitrary and capricious.5 While disagreeing with our legal conclusion that 
the Charter Schools Act of 19986 (Charter Schools Act) deprives us of jurisdiction to 
make designations pursuant to §201.7(a) of the Act, Justice Lobis found that, as a
4 Sisulu-Walker Charter School of Harlem, 45 PERB 1J3000.18 (2012).
5 Sisulu-Walker Charter School of Harlem v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, supra, 
note 2.
) 6 Educ Law §§2850, et seq.
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matter of law, the at-issue employees are not managerial or confidential under criteria 
set forth in §201.7(a) of the Act. In' reaching her decision, Justice Lobis correctly 
recognized that a remand to the Board was unwarranted because we would have 
reached the same legal conclusion under §201.7(a) of the Act in light of our findings.7 
Sisulu-Walker has filed a notice of appeal concerning the decision, order and judgment 
dismissing its Article 78 proceeding.
C. UFT’s Improper Practice Charge
During the pendency of the Article 78 proceeding, the LIFT filed the present 
charge alleging that Sisulu-Walker violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it failed to 
respond to UFT demands dated June 28, 2012 and July 7, 2012, seeking 
commencement of negotiations. Following a conference call between the Director and 
the parties concerning the charge, Sisulu-Walker submitted a letter to the Director 
acknowledging that:
There is no dispute that demands to bargain were made as 
referenced in the charge and that the employer has refused 
to bargain because it believes that it is not appropriate to so 
given the related court litigation.8 . ,
7 See, Town of Walworth, 43 PERB H3013 (2010); Fashion Institute of Technology, 42 
PERB ^3018 (2009); City of Binghamton, 10 PERB 1J3038 (1977). The concept of 
managerial and confidential employees predates the 1971 amendment to §201.7 of the 
Act. Under our decisional law prior to the 1971 amendment, we excluded managerial or 
confidential employees from the at-issue negotiating unit. When the Legislature 
amended §201.7 of the Act, it codified the applicable criteria applied by us but created a 
new procedure wherein an employee designated as managerial or confidential is 
excluded from the Act’s coverage. See, State of New York, 1 PERB TJ399.21 (1968); 
State of New York, 5 PERB TJ3001 (1972).
8 Letter of Phillip H. Wang, October 25, 2012.
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A briefing schedule was set by the Director in a letter to the parties dated 
November 9, 2012. Under the schedule, each party was permitted the opportunity to 
file briefs on or before November 30, 2012. The UFT served and filed a brief consistent 
with the briefing schedule, which was received by the Director on December 3, 2012, 
with an affidavit of service stating it was served by mail upon the attorney for Sisulu- 
Walker.
During a telephone conversation with the Director on December 17, 2012, Sisulu- 
Walker’s counsel acknowledged receipt of the UFT’s brief. Fie denied, however, 
receiving the Director’s November 9, 2012 letter and requested an extension of time to 
file a brief on behalf of his client. The Director instructed him to contact UFT’s counsel 
to obtain its position concerning the requested extension and to explain why he had not 
made the request earlier. Despite Sisulu-Walker’s counsel’s failure to follow the 
Director’s instructions, the Director sent a letter dated December 19, 2012, wherein an 
.extension was granted until December 24, 2012. On December 24, 2012, Sisulu- 
Walker filed its brief with a copy of its notice of appeal concerning the decision, order 
and judgment dismissing its Article 78 proceeding.
DISCUSSION
We begin with Sisulu-Walker’s claim that the Director made a prejudicial 
procedural ruling when he granted its request for an extension of time to file a brief, but 
required the brief to be filed on or before December 24, 2012.
While Sisulu-Walker claims not to have received the Director’s November 9,
2012 briefing schedule, it did receive the UFT’s brief, which was served by mail on
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November 30, 2012. When it sought the extension of time from the Director, it did not 
provide a reason for its delay in making the request after receipt of the UFT’s brief. 
Similarly, its exceptions do not explain the delay, or its failure to contact the UFT as 
instructed by the Director on December 17, 2012. Furthermore, Sisulu-Walker does not 
articulate any actual prejudice resulting from the Director’s grant of an extension. In 
fact, the extension provided Sisulu-Walker with a distinct advantage in that, unlike the 
UFT, it had an opportunity to respond to its opponent’s arguments.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the Director acted well within his 
discretion in granting Sisulu-Walker’s request for an extension, and requiring that the 
brief be filed on or before December 24, 2012.
Sisulu-Walker’s exceptions to the Director’s decision finding that it violated §209- 
a.1(d) of the Act are equally without merit. The public policy of New York, as set forth in 
the Act, favors collective negotiations between public employers and public employees 
as a means for ensuring harmonious and cooperative relationships in public 
employment and avoiding interruptions in governmental operations.9 Section 204.2 of 
the Act mandates that an employer meet at reasonable times and negotiate in good 
faith with a certified or recognized employee organization concerning terms and 
conditions of employment. The refusal of an employer to negotiate constitutes an 
improper practice under §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act. The requirement that an employer 
negotiate with a certified or recognized employee organization was extended to all New
9 Civ Serv Law §200.
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York charter schools through enactment of the Charter Schools Act.10 1 The importance 
of charter schools complying with its obligations under the Act is reflected in Education 
Law §2855(d), which grants PERB a preliminary adjudicatory role in the charter 
revocation process.
Contrary to Sisulu-Walker’s argument, the fact that it sought judicial review of our
uniting determination, and has filed a notice of appeal from Justice Lobis’s decision,
order and judgment, does not constitute a defense to its admitted failure to respond to
the UFT’s request to commence negotiations following our certification and order to
negotiate. Our reasoning and conclusion in Hempstead Union Free School District11 is
equally applicable to the present case:
Respondent argues that because it is now seeking a 
reversal of our decision rejecting managerial status for 
building principals, its obligation to negotiate with the 
charging party on behalf of the building principals is 
somehow not applicable. In effect, it asserts that it has an 
automatic stay by reason of the fact that it has appealed 
from the PERB decision. No such automatic stay is provided 
and no actual stay has been sought from or granted by the 
courts.
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Sisulu-Walker’s exceptions and affirm the 
Director’s decision concluding that it violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. The conduct by 
Sisulu-Walker in the present case constitutes a flagrant disregard of its legal obligations 
under the Act and the Charter School Act to engage in good faith collective negotiations 
with the UFT.
10 Educ Law §§2850, 2854.3.
11 7 PERB ^3017 at 3025-6 (1974). See also, Hempstead Union Free Sch Dist, 7 
PERB H3032 (1974).
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Nothing in this decision, however, precludes the parties from mutually agreeing 
to limit the scope of their initial negotiations to those unit employees who are not in 
dispute.
IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED that Sisulu-Walker will:
1. Forthwith respond to the UFT’s request to commence negotiations;
2. Not refuse to engage in good faith negotiations with the UFT 
concerning the terms and conditions of employment of unit 
employees; and
3. Sign, post and distribute the attached notice at all physical and
electronic locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees.
DATED: April 12,2013
Albany, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES
PURSUANT TO
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
and in order to effectuate the policies of the
NEW YORK STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT
we hereby notify all employees of Sisulu-Walker Charter School of Harlem 
in the unit represented by United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, 
AFL-CIO (UFT), that the Sisulu-Walker Charter School of Harlem will:
1. Forthwith respond to the UFT’s request to schedule negotiations; and
2. Engage in good faith negotiations with the UFT concerning the terms 
and conditions of employment of unit employees. '
Dated ............  B y ...................................... ..
on behalf of Sisulu-W alker 
Charter School of Harlem
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, WESTCHESTER 
COUNTY LOCAL #860, CITY OF WHITE PLAINS 
UNIT #9152,
Charging Party,
-and-
CASE NO. U-29374
CITY OF WHITE PLAINS,
Respondent.
STEVEN A. CRAIN and DAREN J. RYLEWICZ, GENERAL COUNSELS
(MIGUEL G. ORTIZ of counsel), for Charging Party
LAMB & BARNOSKY, LLP (ALYSON MATHEWS of counsel), for
Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; Westchester County Local #860, City 
of White Plains Unit #9152 (CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing an improper practice charge alleging that the City of White Plains (City) 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally discontinued a multi-year past practice of two unit members working an 
additional five hours per week at their discretion for the purpose of increasing their 
annual salaries.1
Following a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge on the grounds that the extra
1 45 PERB1J4598 (2012).
Case No. U-29374 - 2 -
hours worked constituted overtime under the terms of the collectively negotiated 
agreement (agreement) between the City and CSEA, and the availability of overtime 
constitutes a nonmandatory subject under the Act.
EXCEPTIONS
In its exceptions, CSEA challenges the ALJ’s failure to find that the City violated 
§209-a.1 (d) of the Act by unilaterally discontinuing an enforceable past practice 
involving hours of work and wages, under which two CSEA unit employees were 
permitted to work up to five extra hours each week to increase their salaries. CSEA 
argues that the ALJ was mistaken in concluding that the additional hours worked 
constituted overtime under the terms of the parties’ agreement, rather than an 
expansion of the employees’ workweek. Finally, CSEA contends that the ALJ erred in 
failing to credit the testimony of its witnesses over the testimony of the City’s witness, 
and failing to grant a negative inference against the City for not calling certain relevant 
witnesses.
The City supports the ALJ’s decision on various grounds including that the ALJ 
correctly determined that at-issue practice concerns the availability of overtime for the 
two CSEA unit members. Furthermore, the City urges denial of CSEA’s exceptions on 
the ground that they fail to comply with §213.2(b) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules).
Following our review of the record and the parties’ argument, we reverse the 
ALJ’s decision, and remand the case for further processing consistent with our decision.
FACTS
The relevant facts in the present case are largely undisputed. The parties’ 
agreement does not identify a specific workday or workweek for CSEA unit members.
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Instead, Article II of the agreement states:
ARTICLE II -  WORKDAY - WORKWEEK
The present rules as heretofore practiced of the 
various authorities, departments and the present ordinances 
of the Employer as heretofore existed shall govern the 
number of hours per day and per week which an employee 
will be required to work.
Any change in existing schedules shall be subject to 
notification, in writing, to the Union and all affected 
employees.
-- Flex Time Schedule. The department head and
individual employee(s) may agree upon a flexible work 
schedule, subject to approval of the Law Department. 
Nothing in this paragraph shall otherwise modify the City’s 
position that it has the right to unilaterally implement flexible 
work schedules, or the Union’s position that such schedules 
must be negotiated with the Union prior to implementation.
Article III, §§10(A)(1)(a), and 10(A)(4) of the agreement state:
SECTION 10 -  PREMIUM PAY
A. Overtime Pay
1. The Employer shall pay time and one-half the employee’s rate of pay 
(except as hereinafter referred to) for all hours worked in excess of forty 
hours per week, as may be authorized by the Mayor.
a. Employees who normally work fewer than forty hours per week 
shall be paid straight time or compensatory time off at the 
Employer’s option for all hours worked between their normal 
workweek up to forty hours. They shall be paid time and one-half 
the employee’s rate of pay for all time worked in excess of forty 
hours or on the employee’s sixth day of work in the employee’s 
work week.
4. Lists of overtime worked shall be posted weekly. The Employer agrees 
to equal distribution of overtime within classifications and within 
departments to the extent this is equitable and practicable. A record of 
actual overtime hours worked by employee shall be maintained and made 
available to the Union representatives. Employees who decline overtime 
will be credited with the actual hours worked on the assignment for
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purposes of equitable distribution (e.g., an employee refusing an OT 
assignment of four hours will be credited as having worked four OT hours 
on the weekly list.)
The at-issue CSEA unit employees are Bruce Barrese (Barrese) and Michael 
Caldarola (Caldarola). Barrese is a Parking Ramp Attendant Supervisor, Grade 12, and 
Cladarola is a Senior Ramp Attendant, Grade 10. Each has held his position for over 
two decades. '
On February 16, 2000, then Parking Authority Executive Director Albert T. Moroni 
(Moroni)2 submitted a request to City Personnel Officer Elisabeth Wallace (Wallace) for 
the position of Parking Ramp Attendant Supervisor to be reclassified to Grade 14. 
Attached to the request was a questionnaire signed by Barrese, setting forth his job 
duties and identifying comparable positions classified as Grade 14. At the time, the 
Parking Ramp Attendant Supervisor worked a 35-hour workweek.
In his supporting cover memorandum, Moroni stated:
“It is out desire to have the two Parking Ramp Attendant 
Supervisor positions elevated from their present Grade 12 
level to that of Grade 14, which I believe is commensurate 
with the level of responsibility associated with these 
positions and is on par with the other supervisory positions 
within the City.”
In addition, Moroni informed Wallace that the Parking Authority Board fully supported 
the proposed reclassifications.
On May 3, 2001, Wallace issued a decision with Moroni concurring, denying 
reclassification of the Parking Ramp Attendant Supervisor position. In denying the 
request, Wallace reasoned that employees in the comparative Grade 14 positions
2 Following the July 2004 abolition of the Parking Authority, Moroni was appointed 
Commissioner of the City Department of Parking.
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“worked and were compensated for additional five hours per week,” and therefore, the 
annual compensatory rate for the Parking Ramp Attendant Supervisor position was 
“about the same” as the Grade 14 positions.
In his concurring memorandum, Moroni articulated his disagreement with the
decision’s analysis and reaffirmed his “belief that upgrading these positions to a Grade
14 would have been fair and appropriate.” Moroni stated, in part, the following:
In reviewing your analysis I do not understand the logic you 
applied in attempting to compare the hourly rates of a 35- 
hour workweek WPPA employee with that of a 40-hour 
workweek of a City of White Plains employee. While this 
would appear to be a fair means of comparison on the 
surface, I believe that there are underlying factors which 
have not been considered in this equation. The first and 
most important factor is that these employees have won the 
right to a 35-hour workweek through labor negotiations and 
contract settlements for many years.
In essence, this analysis says to them that “yes, you are 
performing at a higher level in that your work parallels that of 
a Grade 14 in other City departments.” However, in essence 
the way they are interpreting your analysis, as have I, is that 
you are agreeing that their work deserves salaries equivalent 
to that of a Grade 14, but that they must work 40 hours a 
week to achieve it. (Emphasis added)
Barrese testified that shortly after Wallace’s decision, Moroni met with him and 
the other Parking Ramp Attendant Supervisor in the Parking Authority’s conference 
room. During the meeting, Moroni offered them the opportunity to work an additional 
hour each day, at their discretion, to increase their salaries to be equivalent to a Grade 
14 position. For the next eight years, Barrese regularly worked a 40-hour Monday- 
Friday workweek. He was paid straight time for the additional hours but listed them on 
his bi-weekly timesheets in the column for “non-scheduled overtime.” In her decision, 
the ALJ credited Barrese’s testimony that the extra 5 hours during the workweek “were
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intended to help compensate him for the denial of the upgrade application.”3 During the 
same eight year period, Barrese also frequently worked “scheduled overtime” on 
weekends, which was separately documented on his timesheets, and he was 
compensated with premium pay.
During his testimony, Caldarola stated that he met with Moroni, Superintendent 
of Parking Joseph DeSantis (DeSantis), and others in February 2002 to discuss 
reclassifying his position. Rather than making a formal reclassification request, which 
Wallace would likely to deny, Caldarola was advised to begin working an additional hour 
each workday like Barrese. For the next seven years, he worked and was paid straight 
time for an eight hour, rather than a seven hour, workday. He listed the extra hours on 
his bi-weekly timesheets in the column for “non-scheduled overtime” and he separately 
listed the scheduled overtime on the timesheets.
Moroni conceded during his testimony that he was not happy with Wallace’s 
decision regarding Barrese but did not recall meeting with him to discuss the denial. He 
did, however, recall a meeting with Superintendent DeSantis and Deputy Commissioner 
John Larson (Larson) in which they convinced him that there was an operational need 
for Barrese to work additional overtime to complete his workload. He agreed to the 
additional overtime so long as it was supervised by DeSantis and the overtime was 
within budget. According to Moroni, all overtime had to be approved through a chain of 
command and he never granted employees the discretion to determine whether 
overtime was necessary. Moroni described “non-scheduled overtime” as overtime 
caused by exigent circumstances such as a snow emergency or a car fire.
3 Supra, note 1,45 PERB 1J4598 at 4780.
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On April 24, 2009, Moroni issued a memorandum revising the work schedules for 
all City Parking employees by imposing a seven day rotational workweek schedule, 
effective June 1, 2009. As a result of the announced change, the City eliminated the 
practice of Baresse and Calderola working an extra hour each workday at their 
discretion.
DISCUSSION
We begin our discussion with the City’s procedural argument that CSEA’s 
exceptions should be dismissed based upon its purported failure to comply with 
§213.2(b) of our Rules. Following our review of the exceptions and the supporting brief, 
we conclude that CSEA satisfied the mandate of §213.2(b) of our Rules, and therefore 
deny the City's procedural argument.4
Next, we examine CSEA’s exceptions to the ALJ’s decision, which dismissed the 
charge on the basis that the subject of the at-issue practice is nonmandatory because 
the availability of overtime is a staffing decision. The ALJ’s conclusion was premised 
upon the following: Barrese and Caldeola listed the extra hour worked per day on their 
timesheets as “non-scheduled overtime”; the City-CSEA agreement purportedly defined 
working more than 35 hours per week as overtime; and Barrese and Calderola were 
paid for the extra hours they actually worked.
Following our review of the record, we reverse the ALJ’s finding that the subject 
of the practice is nonmandatory. By a preponderance of the evidence, CSEA has 
demonstrated the existence of a multi-year practice, recommended and accepted by the 
City, to increase the annual salaries of Barrese and Caldarola by extending, at their
4 County of Monroe and Sheriff of Monroe County, 45 PERB fl3048 (2012).
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discretion, the regular workday by an hour in lieu of reclassifications. The genesis of 
the practice stemmed from Barrese’s 2001 meeting following Wallace’s reclassification 
denial, which Moroni was unhappy with. The meeting’s occurrence is supported by 
Barrese’s testimony, the timing of the practice’s commencement, and Moroni’s 
memorandum to Wallace expressing his agreement with the employees’ interpretation 
of the denial: “their work deserves salaries equivalent to that of a Grade 14, but that 
they must work 40 hours a week to achieve it.” One year later, the practice was 
extended to Caldarola based upon the conclusion that filing another reclassification 
request with Wallace would be futile.
Under the facts and circumstances of the present case, we find that the 
employees’ listing of the daily extra work in the timesheet column for “non-scheduled 
overtime” does not prove that the extra work performed under the at-issue practice 
constituted overtime. The phrase “non-scheduled overtime” is defined by the City as 
assigned overtime responsive.to an emergency, and it is assigned through a chain of 
command. The daily extra hour performed under the practice, however, was not 
assigned by a supervisor and it was not performed in response to daily exigent 
circumstances.
In addition, the parties’ agreement does not define the term “overtime” or 
distinguish between scheduled and unscheduled overtime. The City did not treat the 
daily extra hours of work by Barrese and Caldarola as overtime under the agreement by 
weekly posting the extra hours they worked nor did it equally distribute the opportunity 
to work those hours. In reaching our conclusion that the extra worked performed was 
not assigned overtime, we have drawn a negative inference based upon the failure of
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the City to call Moroni’s subordinates responsible for supervising Barrese and Caldarola 
during the years of the at-issue practice.5
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ’s decision, reinstate the improper 
practice charge, and remand the case for further processing to determine whether the 
City violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. Nothing in our decision precludes the ALJ from 
determining the City’s defense that CSEA has a reasonably arguable source of right 
under the agreement,' or from hearing arguments from the parties concerning whether 
the case should be deferred to arbitration under our merits or jurisdictional deferral 
policies.
DATED: April 12, 2013
Albany, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
5 County of Tioga, 44 PERB P016 (2011).
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to the Board1 on an exception filed by Jill Guttman (Guttman) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice 
charge alleging that the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of 
New York (District) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when she was harassed, threatened and ultimately terminated 
from a probationary teacher position in retaliation for her protected activity under the 
Act.1 2
1 The Board acknowledges the assistance of law student intern Jeremy Ginsburg in 
the preparation of its decision.
2 45 PERB 1|4606 (2012).
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EXCEPTIONS
In her exception, Guttman asserts that the ALJ erred by crediting the testimony 
of Principal Pauline Shakespeare (Shakespeare) concerning the motivation underlying 
her actions and in failing to find a violation of the Act based upon Shakespeare’s 
statements secretly recorded by Guttman during two meetings. The District supports 
the ALJ’s decision.
Following our review of the parties’ arguments and the record evidence, we 
affirm the ALJ’s decision to dismiss the charge.
FACTS
Guttman’s employment as a District school teacher began on September 7, 
2010. In October 2010, she transferred to P.S. 34, the John Harvard Elementary 
School, in Queens Village and commenced teaching a second grade class. As the 
school’s principal, Shakespeare regularly observed Guttman’s classroom in Fall 2010. 
Guttman received direct verbal feedback from Shakespeare concerning class lessons. 
Shakespeare assigned literacy coach Vera Tomaselli (Tomaselli):to provide Guttman 
with regular guidance concerning literacy instruction. Gwendolyn Brown-Walker 
(Brown-Walker), a staff developer at the school, also provided Guttman with direct 
assistance.
In November or December, 2010, Guttman attended a United Federation of 
Teachers (UFT) meeting in the school’s teacher lounge. Guttman played no role in 
organizing the meeting, which was attended by other teachers. It is undisputed that 
Shakespeare did not know that Guttman attended the meeting.
Case No. U-31232 -3-
On January 5, 2011, Shakespeare sent a letter to Guttman with 
recommendations concerning the proper development of future reading lessons, 
emphasizing the importance of identifying learning objectives. The following day, 
Shakespeare observed Guttman teaching a phonics lesson. The classroom 
observation was consistent with Shakespeare’s practice of observing all second grade 
classrooms.
During a post-observation.conference and in a written report, Shakespeare 
notified Guttman that her phonics lesson on January 6, 2011 was unsatisfactory. The 
report set forth four deficiencies: the lesson appeared unplanned; the learning 
objectives were unclear; Guttman displayed a lack of knowledge in the subject matter; 
and one student did not participate in the entire lesson because he was sorting library 
books.
Shakespeare observed another classroom lesson on January 11, 2011, which 
was followed by a written report concluding that the lesson was unsatisfactory. The 
report set forth a series of concerns including a comment that Guttman’s reading of a
passage “was not fluent and did not provide a model for oral reading for her young
)
students.” Shakespeare’s report about the lesson was discussed with Guttman during 
a subsequent meeting.
On January 18, 2011, Shakespeare met with Guttman to discuss her shared 
reading lesson, the purpose of shared reading and proper questioning techniques. 
Shakespeare was concerned that Guttman did not grasp her responsibilities as an 
instructor. The following day, Shakespeare observed another lesson and provided 
Guttman with an unsatisfactory post-observation report finding that her questioning
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technique needed improvement and her reading continued to be less than fluent. 
Shakespeare made two recommendations: Guttman should consult with literacy 
coach Tomaselli about observing lessons by other teachers and Guttman should tape 
record her shared reading lessons to help improve her pace during oral readings.
On January 20, 2011, Shakespeare directed Guttman to attend a January 24, 
2011 meeting and advised her to bring a UFT union representative. At the January 
24, 2011 meeting, Shakespeare informed Guttman and the UFT representative that 
Guttman was in danger of receiving an unsatisfactory performance rating for the 2010 
2011 school year. Two days after the meeting, Guttman received a follow-up letter 
from Shakespeare outlining her performance deficiencies. In addition, the letter 
stated:
Please be advised that a plan of assistance will be 
developed to support in the hope of avoiding an adverse 
rating in June 2011. This plan will include, but not 
necessarily be limited to the weekly submission of lesson 
plans, weekly meetings with Ms. Tomaselli and peer . 
observation. Your progress with regard to this plan will be 
assessed by March 1,2011.3
While it is undisputed that Guttman was in regular communication with another 
UFT representative in January 2011 concerning the unsatisfactory reports and the 
level of support she was receiving from the school, there is no record evidence that 
Shakespeare knew bf Guttman’s communications with the UFT prior to the January 
24, 2011 meeting.
On February 1, 2011, Guttman received a plan of assistance from . . . . . .
Shakespeare delineating a course of support aimed at avoiding an unsatisfactory
3 Charging Party Exhibit 9.
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rating for the school year. The plan included scheduled meetings with Tomaselli for 
additional guidance concerning literacy lessons, and weekly meetings with staff 
developer Brown-Walker to develop math lessons and create an effective classroom 
learning environment. Guttman testified that she communicated with Tomaselli on a 
daily basis and attended staff development meetings with Brown-Walker.
On February 9, 2011, Guttman observed another teacher’s second grade 
classroom to obtain ideas about making her classroom more child-friendly. After the 
visit, Guttman met with Shakespeare to discuss steps she intended to implement to 
improve her classroom environment.
Shakespeare and staff developer Brown-Walker met with Guttman and another 
second grade teacher on February 18, 2011, after Shakespeare had observed their 
classrooms. Unbeknownst to Shakespeare and Brown-Walker, the meeting was 
secretly recorded by Guttman utilizing her iPhone voice recorder.4
The meeting centered on the unsatisfactory nature of the teachers' 
performance concerning student literacy despite the level of support they received 
from the school including workshops, weekly meetings, coaching and mentoring. 
During the meeting, Shakespeare expressed frustration that the teachers were limiting 
themselves by failing to take initiative to improve literacy lesson planning and
4 A compact disc of Guttman’s secret recordings of the February 18, 2011 meeting and 
another meeting with Shakespeare on April 28, 2011 was admitted into evidence 
without objection from the District. Transcript, p.182; Charging Party Exhibiti 18(a). 
Two documents prepared by Guttman containing typed excerpts from the recordings 
were admitted into evidence over the District’s objection. Transcript, pp.182-186; 
Charging Party Exhibits 18(b) and (c). While the correctness of the evidentiary rulings 
is questionable, the District did not preserve the admissibility issue concerning the 
compact disc and did not file cross-exceptions concerning the admission of Guttman’s 
typed excerpts. As a result, neither issue is before us.
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performance. She also referenced complaints received from the UFT about the 
teachers not receiving sufficient support from the school. Shakespeare emphasized 
that the school is noted for teacher training and that it has provided them with training 
and mentoring.
During her testimony, Shakespeare acknowledged that a UFT representative 
spoke to her in late January or early February 2011 about Guttman’s status and the 
level of support she was receiving from the school. On cross-examination, 
Shakespeare denied she spoke about that conversation during the February 18, 2011 
meeting. In addition, she testified that she did not recall stating that the teachers were 
limiting themselves, the school is noted for teacher training, and the UFT had
i
contacted her about second grade teachers not receiving sufficient support.
Following the first day of hearing, Shakespeare was given an opportunity to 
listen to the audio recording of the meeting. Thereafter, Shakespeare acknowledged 
on redirect that she was upset during the meeting because she believed that the UFT 
received incorrect information about the level of support provided to the second grade 
teachers. Shakespeare also admitted telling both teachers at the meeting that they 
were limiting.themselves, and that the complaints to the UFT were contradicted by the 
scope of the school’s efforts to support them.
For the next four weeks, Shakespeare visited Guttman's classroom on a daily 
basis, and spoke with her about her job performance. On March 17, 2011, 
Shakespeare provided Guttman with a written observation report concluding that her 
math lesson was unsatisfactory. On the same day, after speaking with the 
superintendent, Shakespeare submitted a report to the District finding that Guttman’s
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performance was unsatisfactory and recommended discontinuance of her 
probationary service.
After submitting the probationary report and recommendation, Shakespeare 
continued to observe Guttman's classroom performance until the end of the school 
year. On April 28, 2011, following a classroom observation, Shakespeare summoned 
Guttman to attend a meeting along with Tomaselli to discuss multiple pedagogical 
problems observed during her classroom visit. The subjects discussed included 
assignments of books below students’ reading levels, the lack of independent reading, 
and the poor quality and incompleteness of student handwriting books. As part of her 
critique, Shakespeare referenced specific students and expressed deep concerns that 
the status quo would “kill the love of reading,” and that students were “never going to 
learn to write." She told Guttman that she did not know how to manage a classroom 
and did not understand her responsibilities as a teacher.
Shakespeare also stated that:
If anybody had told me Ms. Guttman that I could have a 
teacher in this building like this, I would have said no. I 
have asked you, I have coddled you. I have never been so 
gentle with anybody. Never, never, but l am very careful 
with you because I see how you think and how you think 
and (know you). You think you are going to use the union 
against me. It doesn't work like that. My dear (the only)
The Union cannot protect a bad teacher, cannot, cannot!
So I am going to go by the book with you. But I don't want 
you here. I can't afford it. These kids can't.afford it. You 
can't teach.
As I said I have to be very careful with you because my 
God, you know if you had played your cards right, you 
could have gone on and done something else, but now I 
have to be very, very careful.
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I just want you to understand that this is not acceptable, 
not acceptable, not acceptable. See, in certain 
neighborhoods the children can bounce back. These 
children can't bounce back.5
In response to Guttman’s claim that her students were learning, Shakespeare
replied that Guttman felt that way because she was "arrogant." In response to
Guttman’s rejection of the characterization, Shakespeare stated:
I know. See, you are still arrogant because you are 
deferring (sic.) to what I am saying. Very arrogant and 
that’s why you don’t learn. You and Ms. Lall really are the 
first people that I have ever taught that can’t learn.
Usually, all the experts in this building, we all started 
together and grew up together. Your arrogance has 
prevented you from learning. The very fact that you are 
challenging wheat (sic.) I am saying is proof enough. You 
are telling me that the children are learning. If they are 
learning, Ms. Guttman, they could have learned 10 times 
more because you can’t do the job.6
Shakespeare also told Guttman during the meeting that she would not allow 
her to “tell anyone that I told you to resign....I know people too well to get myself into 
trouble that way. There is a process that we have to follow and we are going to follow 
that process.”7
According to Tomaselli, Shakespeare labeled Guttman as arrogant due to her 
failure to grow professionally despite extensive training provided by the school. 
Tomaselli described Shakespeare and Guttman as being frustrated during the 
meeting.
5 Charging Party Exhibit 18(c).
6 Charging Party Exhibit 18(c).
’ Charging Party Exhibit 18(a).
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Guttman received a letter on May 5, 2011 notifying her that she would be 
terminated, effective June 10, 2011. On May 27, 2011, Guttman received another 
unsatisfactory report following Shakespeare’s observation of a writing lesson. In the 
report, Shakespeare stated that the conditions of students' notebooks continued to be 
unacceptable and that Guttman failed to utilize the templates for writing instructions 
required by the school’s literacy program.
On Guttman’s last day at the school, she received an unsatisfactory 
performance rating for the school year. Three other P.S. 34 teachers also received 
unsatisfactory ratings.
DISCUSSION
In an improper practice charge alleging unlawfully motivated interference or 
discrimination in violation of §§209-a.1(a) and/or (c) of the Act, a charging party has 
the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of evidence that: a) the affected 
individual engaged in protected activity under the Act; b) such activity was known to 
the person or persons taking the employment action; and c) the employment action 
would not have been taken "but for" the protected activity.8
To meet the relatively low initial threshold for demonstrating a prima facie case,
a charging party must present sufficient evidence to give rise to an inference that
improper motivation under the Act was a factor in a respondent’s actions. If the
evidence establishes that inference, the burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent
to rebut the inference by presenting evidence demonstrating that its conduct was
8 UFT, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (Jenkins), 41 PERB 1)3007 (2008)(subsequent history 
omitted); County of Wyoming, 34 PERB 1)3042 (2001); Stockbridge Valley Cent Sch 
Dist, 26 PERB p007 (2000); County of Orleans, 25 PERB 1)3010 (1992); Town of 
Independence, 23 PERB P020 (1990); City of Salamanca, 18 PERB 1)3012 (1985).
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motivated by a legitimate non-discriminatory business reason.9 If the respondent 
presents evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the 
charging party to establish that the proffered reason is pretextual.10 1At all times,- 
however, the burden of proof remains with the charging party to demonstrate the 
requisite causation under the Act by a preponderance of the evidence.11
In the present case, we find no basis in the record to disturb the ALJ’s 
credibility finding, which was limited to crediting Shakespeare’s testimony that she did 
not issue formal negative evaluations prior to January 2011 in order to provide 
Guttman with an opportunity to develop her professional skills. The evidence fully 
supports the conclusion that Shakespeare purposefully delayed conducting formal 
evaluations because Guttman was new to the profession and the school.
In addition, we conclude that Guttman has not demonstrated a prima facie case 
of improper motivation with respect to Shakespeare’s criticisms and unsatisfactory 
evaluations on and before January 24, 2011 because Guttman failed to prove an 
essential element: Shakespeare’s knowledge of the protected activity. While Guttman 
engaged in protected activity by attending the 2010 UFT meeting, Shakespeare did 
not know of Guttman’s attendance at that meeting. With respect to Guttman’s 
contacts with the UFT in January 2011, Shakespeare first learned that Guttman had 
communicated with the UFT when Guttman brought a union representative with her to 
the January 24, 2011 meeting at Shakespeare’s suggestion. At the meeting, 
Shakespeare reiterated her criticisms of Guttman’s performance and warned her that
9 Town of Tuscarora, 45 PERB 1J3044 (2012).
10 UFT, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (Jenkins), supra, note 8.
11 Elwood Union Free Sch Dist, 43 PERB 1f3012 (2010).
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she was in danger of receiving an unsatisfactory performance rating for the school 
year. Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the dismissal of the charge with respect to 
the unsatisfactory evaluations and criticisms on and before January 24, 2011.
With respect to the remainder of the charge, we find that Guttman presented 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate a prima facie case of improper motivation under 
the Act concerning events following the January 24, 2011 meeting, thereby shifting the 
burden of persuasion to the District to demonstrate a legitimate non-discriminatory 
basis for the negative performance evaluations and Guttman’s discharge.
The inference of improper motivation is supported by Shakespeare’s reaction to 
receiving complaints from a UFT representative, following the January 24, 2011 
meeting, concerning second grade teachers not receiving adequate support from the 
school. Certain comments by Shakespeare during the February 18, 2011 and April 
28, 2011 meetings, along with her initial testimonial denials regarding those meetings, 
suggest unlawful retaliatory animus toward Guttman because of her complaints to the 
UFT.12 At the February 18, 2011 meeting, Shakespeare was admittedly upset about 
the complaints. In addition, Shakespeare stated at the April 28, 2011 meeting that 
she had to be “very careful” because Guttman was going to use the UFT against her 
and the UFT “cannot protect a bad teacher.”
Following our review of the record, however, we conclude that the District 
refuted the inference with overwhelming and unrebutted evidence demonstrating a 
legitimate non-discriminatory basis for the negative evaluations and the decision to
12 However, Shakespeare’s inability to recall all aspects of the meetings during her 
testimony, and her need to refresh her recollection, does not constitute proof of 
animus or dishonesty.
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^  discharge: Guttman’s consistently unsatisfactory probationary job performance as a 
second grade teacher despite extensive efforts to help her improve her performance 
and avoid a final unsatisfactory performance rating.
Prior to being aware of Guttman’s protected activity, Shakespeare had already 
negatively critiqued her job performance. In addition, she discussed with Guttman 
the nature of those deficiencies. Shakespeare also provided recommendations for 
improving her performance including observing other teachers and utilizing a tape 
recorder to enhance her oral reading during literacy lessons.
Notably, it was Shakespeare who recommended that Guttman obtain UFT 
representation for the January 24, 2011 meeting. At the meeting, Shakespeare 
reiterated Guttman’s performance deficiencies and warned that she was in danger of 
. receiving an unsatisfactory performance rating at the end of the school year.
)
Following the meeting, Shakespeare prepared and sent a written plan of assistance 
aimed at avoiding the negative school year performance rating. Thereafter, Guttman 
also received regular assistance from Tomaselli and Brown-Walker and met with 
Shakespeare concerning measures to improve her classroom.
The February 18, 2011 meeting with Guttman, another teacher and staff 
developer Brown-Walker was an outgrowth of Shakespeare’s continued 
dissatisfaction with both teachers’ job performance despite the school’s extensive 
efforts to help them. At the meeting, Shakespeare was frustrated by the teachers’ 
lack of improvement despite the school’s extensive assistance, and their failure to act 
upon suggested measures for self-improvement. Her annoyance at the inaccuracies
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in the complaints to the UFT regarding the support provided is insufficient evidence to 
rebut her well-documented dissatisfaction with Guttman’s job performance.
Similarly, we conclude that Shakespeare’s comments at the April 28, 2011 
meeting do not rebut the overwhelming evidence demonstrating that the evaluations 
and discharge were motivated by Guttman’s unsatisfactory performance. The 
meeting took place over a month after Shakespeare submitted her report 
recommending the probationary termination. It focused on multiple problems found 
during Shakespeare’s latest visit to Guttman’s classroom. During the meeting, 
Shakespeare expressed her strong belief that Guttm'an was not competent to teach 
and was depriving second grade students of a proper education in reading and 
writing. Shakespeare cited Guttman’s arrogance as a reason for her failure to 
improve as a teacher despite the efforts by the school to assist her. While Guttman 
contested Shakespeare’s opinions, that is not sufficient to rebut the non-discriminatory
, l
motivation underlying the adverse actions.
Finally, the evidence demonstrates that Shakespeare’s comments during the 
April 28, 2011 meeting about utilization of the UFT against her and that the UFT. 
cannot protect a bad teacher do not violate §209-a.1 (a) of the Act. Both comments 
were clear statements of opinion, and within the context of the meeting, they cannot 
be construed as a deliberate attempt to interfere with and restrain Guttman from 
exercising her right under the Act to obtain UFT representation. Nor can they be 
construed as an effort to persuade Guttman that it would be futile to exercise her right 
to employee organizational representation, thereby chilling the exercise of that right.13
13 Brunswick Cent Sch Dist (Jackson), 19 PERB fl3063 (1986).
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the improper practice charge is hereby
dismissed.
Dated: April 12,2013
Albany, New York
/A rtyrU -^ /  ___  ______
/ /  Jerome Lef^owitz^Chairperson
(2
Sheila S. Cote, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 1179
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. TIA2012-022
MTA BUS COMPANY
Respondent.
GLADSTEIN REIF & MEGINNISS LLP, ESQ., BETH M. MARGOLIS 
of counsel), for Petitioner
PROSKAUER ROSE, LLP (NEIL H. ABRAMSON, ESQ., of 
counsel), for Respondent
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us from a report and recommendation of the Director of 
Conciliation (Director) dated April 2, 2013, regarding a petition for interest arbitration 
filed by the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1179 (ATU) under §209.5 of the Public 
Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) and §205.15 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) 
with respect to an impasse in contract negotiations between ATU and the MTA Bus 
Company (MTA).
In his report and recommendation, the Director concludes that a voluntary 
resolution of the contract negotiations between the ATU and the MTA Cannot be 
effected and recommends that the impasse be referred to a public interest arbitration 
panel.
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The MTA has not filed an objection to the Director’s report and recommendation, 
pursuant to §205.15(b) of the Rules.
. Following our review of the Director’s report and recommendation, we hereby 
certify that a voluntary resolution of the contract negotiations between the ATU and the 
MTA cannot be effected and we, therefore, refer the impasse involving these parties to 
a public interest arbitration panel.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 12, 2013
Albany, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO, C-6135
COUNTY OF CHAUTAUGUA and CHAUTAUGQUA 
COUNTY SHERIFF,
Employer,
-and-
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY SHERIFF’S EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION,
Intervenor.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, the incumbent is decertified and,
IT IS CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees
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of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances.
Included: Pilot, Cook, Emergency and Police Dispatcher, Emergency and
Police Dispatcher Trainee, Senior Emergency and Police 
Dispatcher, Correction Officer, Senior Correction Officer, 
Recreation Specialist/Correction Officer, Seasonal Deputy Sheriff 
when assigned to navigation and patrol and part-time Corrections 
Officers.
Excluded: All other employees of Chautauqua County.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: April 12, 2013
Albany, New York
/ Jerome
Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6124
TOWN OF PINE PLAINS,
Employer,
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act,
IT IS PIEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances.
Included: All members of the police department of the Town of Pine Plains*
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Excluded: The officer in charge of the police department and all other
employees of the Town of Pine Plains.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: April 12,2013
Albany, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of 
JAMES CARTER,
- and -
Petitioner,
UNIONDALE PUBLIC LIBRARY,
CASE NO. C-.6160
Employer,
- and -
UNIONDALE PUBLIC LIBRARY STAFF 
ASSOCIATION,
Intervenor.
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
On October 9, 2012, James Carter (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules 
of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking 
decertification of the intervenor as the exclusive representative of certain employees of 
the Uniondale Public Library (employer).
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate:
Included: All regular full-time and part-time employees in the titles of
Librarian III, Librarian II, Librarian I, Library Aide, Senior Typist 
Clerk, Clerk Typist, Senior Library Clerk, Clerk, Clerk B-Lingual, 
Page and Cleaner.
Excluded: All other employees.
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on January 31,
2013, at which a majority of ballots were cast in favor of the intervenor.
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible
voters in the unit who cast ballots desire to be represented by the intervenor for the
purpose of collective bargaining, the incumbent remains the exclusive representative of
the unit employees and IT IS ORDERED that the petition is dismissed.
DATED: April 12, 2013
Albany, New York
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairperson
< 2 ,
Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of • >
ROMULUS ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6120
ROMULUS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Employer,
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees'1 Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act,
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Romulus Administrators Association has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees, of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances.
Included: Pre K-12 principal, assistant principal/data coordinator and building
maintenance supervisor.
Certification - C-6120
Excluded: All other employees.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the Romulus Administrators Association. The duty to
\
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder,
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: April 12, 2013
Albany, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
COMMANDING OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF LONG 
BEACH, N.Y, INC.,
Petitioner,
-and- CASE NO. C-6082
CITY OF LONG BEACH,
Employer,
-and- v
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
THE CITY OF LONG BEACH, INC.,
Intervenor.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE
■ A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, ,
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act,
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Commanding Officers Association of Long 
Beach, N.Y., Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of
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the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances.
Included: ' Employees who have attained the civil service rank of police 
lieutenant and above.
Excluded: All police officers below the rank of lieutenant.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall
negotiate collectively with the Commanding Officers Association of Long Beach, N.Y.,
Inc.. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,'hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
DATED: April 12, 2013
Albany, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 687,
- and -
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN,
Petitioner,
Employer,
- and -
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION,
Intervenor.
CASE NO. C-6175
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
On January 9, 2013, the Teamsters Local 687 (petitioner) filed, in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition 
seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain employees of the County 
of Franklin (employer).
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate:
Included: Full and less than full-time Cook, Cook/Manager, Clerk, Account
Clerk/Civil Deputy, Correction Officer, Deputy Sheriff/Correction 
Officer, Senior Account Clerk, Correction Officer Sergeant,
Deputy Sheriff/Correction Officer Sergeant, Deputy Sheriff/Civil 
• Officer, Senior Account Clerk/Civil Deputy and less than full-time 
Licensed Practical Nurse and Registered Nurse.
Excluded: Sheriff, Undersheriff, Warden, Principal Account Clerk/Typist,
Correctional Facility Nurse and all other employees.
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on April 4, 2013, at
which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner.
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of
collective bargaining by the petitioner, the incumbent remains the exclusive
representative of the unit employees, and IJ IS ORDERED that the petition is
dismissed.
DATED: April 12,2013
Albany, New York
Sheila S. Cole, Member
